Credit-Based Relay Selection Algorithm Using Stackelberg Game by Ayub, N. & Rakocevic, V.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Ayub, N. and Rakocevic, V. ORCID: 0000-0002-3081-0448 (2019). Credit-Based 
Relay Selection Algorithm Using Stackelberg Game. Wireless Days, doi: 
10.1109/WD.2019.8734269 
This is the accepted version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/22524/
Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/WD.2019.8734269
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
Credit-Based Relay Selection Algorithm Using Stackelberg Game
Naumana Ayub
Department of Electrical and Electronic
Engineering
City, University of London, United Kingdom
naumana.ayub.1@city.ac.uk
Veselin Rakocevic
Department of Electrical and Electronic
Engineering
City, University of London, United Kingdom
veselin.rakocevic.1@city.ac.uk
Abstract— Public wireless networks usually comprise of self-
interested users who are reluctant to cooperate with other
users of the network unless and until they are provided with
some incentives. This paper presents a new incentive-based
relay selection algorithm, which motivates the self-interested
in-range mobile users to act as relays providing network access
to the out-of-range users, thus extending the coverage range
of a wireless network. The new Credit-based Relay Selection
(CRS) algorithm uses Stackelberg game employing a credit-
based incentive mechanism, providing instantaneous as well as
long-term benefit to the selfish in-range users. In addition to
this, the CRS algorithm takes into account both the achievable
data rate at the out-of-range user and fair consumption of
battery power of in-range user as the relay selection criteria.
Simulation results presented in this paper show that when the
CRS algorithm is used for relay selection, it is advantageous
even for the self-interested in-range users to participate in the
relaying process to earn some benefit to utilize it when they
move outside the transmission range of access point and need
to buy assistance from other users. The CRS algorithm also
provides better data rate to the out-of-range users as well as
fair utilization of battery power of the in-range users compared
to a default algorithm which uses Signal to Interference and
Noise Ratio (SINR) as relay selection criterion.
I. INTRODUCTION
To avoid the infrastructural and operational cost of spe-
cialized relay stations, ordinary mobile users have been used
to support cooperative communication between the source
and the destination as well as to extend the coverage area
of a wireless network. Usage of ordinary mobile users as
relays requires them to cooperate with one another. However,
a public wireless network may comprise of self-interested
users who are not always willing to cooperate and are only
interested in their own benefit. The factors that contribute
towards the selfishness of the users are [1]: 1) lack of
resources, e.g. low battery power, available memory or
computational capability 2) security concern of receiving
malicious information from other users of the network 3)
no incentive to collaborate with other users. These self-
interested users need to be given proper incentives in order
to make them use their resources for providing relay service
to other users of the network [5]–[9], [13] and [14].
To encourage the selfish users to participate in collab-
orative communication, reputation based and credit-based
mechanisms are two commonly used cooperative incentive
mechanisms [2]. The reputation of a node/ user in a wireless
network basically represents its willingness to utilize its
resources for other users of the network, which can be deter-
mined either centrally at a specialized control station or indi-
vidually at each node. The main advantage of this approach is
detection of misbehaving selfish and/ or malicious nodes and
isolating them, since the reputation of a node is computed
based on observations from multiple entities [3]. However,
there are several issues with reputation based mechanisms
which have not been addressed [4]. Firstly, the incentives
given to the selfish nodes have not been properly analyzed.
In order to earn good reputation, network users may be over
generously using their resources, thus putting themselves at
a loss. Secondly, the selfish nodes may conspire to increase
their benefit which has not been considered in reputation
based schemes. Also these schemes rely on broadcast nature
of wireless channel to compute reputation which with the
introduction of directional antennas will become difficult and
challenging.
In credit based-mechanisms, a user earns tokens or mon-
etary benefits by assisting fellow users of the network.
These tokens and monetary benefits compensate for the
cost incurred by the cooperating users, which may be in
terms of battery power consumption, sharing of bandwidth or
transmission time. The earned credits can then be utilized to
purchase cooperation from other users when needed and thus
putting the users with no credits at disadvantage. The users
considered in this paper are self-interested but not malicious,
therefore, the relay selection algorithm proposed in this paper
employs a credit-based mechanism to encourage the self-
interested users to take part in the data forwarding service
to the out-of-range users, to extend the coverage area of the
network.
The network model studied in this paper consists of two
types of users, the users which can directly access their data
from the access point (AP) are termed as the in-range users.
Whereas the users which require assistance from the in-range
intermediate users to communicate with the AP are called
the out-of-range users. The in-range intermediate users are
assumed to selfish which need to be incentivized in order
to make them help the out-of-range users. Stackelberg game
has been utilized to formulate a Credit-based Relay Selection
(CRS) algorithm which takes into account the instantaneous
benefit of both in-range and out-of-range users as well as
provides long-term benefit to the in-range users.
The instantaneous benefit of the in-range user depends
on the price it receives from the out-of-range users for its
services. The price advertised by the in-range user is in turn
dependent on the relaying cost it experienced. The relaying
cost is calculated using the ratio of average to instantaneous
battery power dissipation of the in-range user to ensure that
all in-range users get the opportunity to act as relays resulting
in fair utilization of battery power. The price paid to the in-
range is accumulated as credits by the in-range user which
it can utilize to purchase data relaying service for itself
when it becomes the out-of-range user. Thus providing long-
term benefit to the in-range users. The main contribution of
this paper is the detailed analysis of the CRS algorithm in
terms of long-term benefit of the in-range users when they
exchange their role and become the out-of-range users.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows: sec-
tion II summarizes the literature on credit-based incentive
techniques encouraging the selfish intermediate users to
participate in cooperative communication. The system model
and the proposed CRS game are described in section III. The
CRS algorithm based on the CRS game is provided in section
IV. The simulated network model and obtained results are
discussed in section V and section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Different credit-based mechanisms and pricing schemes
have been proposed to motivate self-interested users to
collaborate with one another, which can be broadly classified
into three categories. In the first category, the threat of future
punishment is utilized to enforce cooperation among network
users [5]–[7]. The second category provides network users
with opportunities to earn credits and tokens which can
be used later when needed, giving them incentives to help
one another [8]–[12]. Whereas the third category of credit
and pricing mechanisms employs auction theory to promote
collaboration among network users [13], [14].
Altman et al. in [5] enforced cooperation among self-
interested users by punishing the misbehaving users. If the
amount of messages forwarded by a user is less than that
relayed by the other users of the network then a misbehaving
user is identified and as a punishment other users will
decrease the fraction of messages they were relaying for
the misbehaving user. The proposed method leads to partial
cooperation, thus giving some freedom to the network users
to sometimes deliberately choose to save their resources for
themselves and bear less aggressive punishment. Han et al.
[6] also proposed a punishment based policy to enforce
cooperation and to control transmission rate in wireless
networks.
[7] is another work in which the threat of punishment
in future has been used to promote cooperation among the
self-interested users. They have formulated a framework in
which a repeated game is used to enforce collaboration and
a distributed self-learning process is utilized to determine
optimal forwarding probability of each user of the network.
Each user detects the greedy behavior of other user by com-
paring its utility to a threshold value, if the utility is less than
the threshold then it implies that some users are deviating
from cooperation and as a punishment for a fixed period of
time the user who had detected the misbehavior plays non-
cooperatively. The drawback of punishment based incentive
mechanisms is that there is no instantaneous benefit for the
intermediate users and there is no choice available to them
to reserve their resources for their own data transmission.
In [4] a simple credit based system is proposed by Zhang
et al. in which a centralized entity is responsible for receiving
credits from the source node and distributing among the
intermediate nodes assisting the source- destination commu-
nication. However, Zhang et al. have analyzed their scheme
from the prospective of security to avoid cheating from the
selfish nodes by colluding with each other which is out of
scope of this paper.
Crowcroft et al. in [8] devised an incentive model that
stimulates mobile ad-hoc users to act as transit nodes and
earn credits which then be used to send their own traffic.
When a user joins an ad-hoc network, it has some initial
balance, which it can top up by relaying data for other users.
The transit nodes determine the price of their service in a
distributed manner considering the usage of their bandwidth
and power. The traffic generating user, considering its credit
balance, evaluates its willingness to pay to the intermediate
transit nodes. The price the intermediate nodes ask for data
delivery is deducted from the balance of the data generating
node and the credit balance of helping nodes is incremented.
Since Crowcroft et al. used only instantaneous power to
calculate price, some of the intermediate nodes will be
relaying data more frequently than others, thus resulting in
unfair consumption of battery power of intermediate nodes.
In [9], Srinivasan et al. have utilized the Generous TIT-
FOR-TAT (GTFT) algorithm for a wireless ad-hoc node to
determine whether to accept a relaying request or refuse
it. The GTFT algorithm is based on non-cooperative game
theory and employs behavioral strategy in which each player
takes its decision based on the past conduct of other nodes
in the network. The GTFT algorithm will not work for the
network scenario studied in this paper because the in-range
users do not need the out-of-range users to access their data
unless and until they move out of the transmission range of
the access point or base station.
Pricing mechanisms have also been used to incentivize
selfish users to help the other users with low battery power
to achieve energy saving [10]. Stackelberg game and genetic
algorithm have been employed to develop the optimal pricing
model for sharing of bandwidth in an integrated WiMAX and
WiFi network in [11]. Shastry and Adve also formulated
a pricing mechanism that induces cooperation among the
source node and the relays which takes into account both
the real energy cost incurred by the relay and the cost of
delays relay’s own data suffers [12].
Auction theory is another method to promote competition
among selfish users with source nodes being the buyers
offering bids and the relay nodes the sellers [13]. Two auction
mechanisms were proposed by Huang et al. [14] which
are indeed repeated games in which each user knowing the
previous bids of other users iteratively updates its bid in order
to maximize its own utility. Auction based schemes require
Fig. 1. Network comprising of in-range and out-of-range users
a central controlling entity called the auctioneer to govern
the interaction between the seller and the buyer, making it
an infeasible option for the network model studied in this
paper. Similarly the techniques using the threat of future pun-
ishment are not applicable to the considered network model
because the in-range users can directly access their data and
do not need help from the out-of-range users. Therefore, a
new credit-based mechanism providing instantaneous as well
as long-term benefit along with ensuring fair consumption of
battery power of all participating in-range users is needed.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND CREDIT-BASED RELAY
SELECTION (CRS) GAME
The system model studied in this paper is composed of
two types of users, the in-range users and the out-of-range
users as depicted in Figure 1. The out-of-range users cannot
directly communicate with the AP and require help from the
in-range users to access their data. Since the in-range users
are self-interested users, they need to be given incentives to
encourage them utilize their battery power to forward data
to the out-of-range users. Along with compensation for the
cost incurred by the in-range users for acting as relays, they
also have concerns regarding fair utilization of their battery
power. On the other hand, the out-of-range users want to
achieve good data rate through the selected in-range users. A
Credit-base Relay Selection (CRS) game has been developed
which aims to ensure fair consumption of battery power of
in-range users along with attaining better data rate at the
out-of-range users. The CRS game employs a credit-based
mechanism to motivate the in-range users to assist the out-of-
range users, thus gaining instantaneous as well as long-term
benefit for themselves.
Stackelberg game forms the foundation of the proposed
CRS game. Stackelberg game is a seller buyer game which
takes into account the utility of both the seller and the buyer
to determine the optimal strategy each player shall follow to
maximize its utility. In the system model under study, the
in-range users are the sellers of the data forwarding service
and the out-of-range users are the buyers. In the CRS game,
Fig. 2. Decision making at the in-range and out-of-range users for the
Credit-base Relay Selection (CRS) game
the in-range user considering its utility decides whether to
provide relaying service to the out-of-range or not and the
out-of-range user taking into account its utility determines
whether to purchase the service from the in-range user or
not as presented in Figure 2. The out-of-range users want
to maximize their utility which depends on the date rate
achieved by availing the relaying service and the price paid
for the service, given by equation (1).
Uj = Rij − pij (1)
In equation (1), Uj represents the utility of the out-of-range
user j, Rij the data rate at user j achieved through the in-
range user i and pij the price advertised by the in-range user
i for providing assistance to user j. Whereas the utility of
the in-range user i is dependent on the price it advertised
for its service minus the cost incurred while providing the
service and is given by equation (2).
Ui = pij − cij (2)
where Ui is the utility of the in-range user i and cij the cost
experienced by user i for providing relaying service to user
j. Compared to our previous work [15], the utilities of the in-
range and the out-of-range users and the cost are calculated
in the same manner. The cost suffered by user i depends
on its average to instantaneous battery power consumption
given by cij = SBPiSBPij . The main difference is the way the
in-range users determine the price for their service based on
their available battery power and the long-term benefit the
in-range users achieve if they cooperate with the out-of-range
users. A finite budget βij has also been assumed for the out-
of-range users which they can use to buy relaying service
themselves which is the case in practical systems.
The in-range user determines its price using its initial price
which is calculated using the channel parameters and the cost
it will suffer when assisting the out-of-range users. Since
the cost experienced by the in-range user depends on the
battery power used by it to fulfill the data demand of the
out-of-range user, the price is also dependent on the available
battery power. Two battery power threshold values have been
defined for the CRS game. The in-range user increases its
Fig. 3. Graphical representation of the pricing function given in equation(3)
price linearly after relaying data to an out-of-range user until
its battery power reaches the first threshold value i.e. BPth1 .
From BPth1 to the second threshold value, the critical
threshold BPthc , the price is incremented exponentially and
after BPthc the in-range user does not participate in the
relaying process.
f (pij) =

pij + cijt BPi ≥ BPth1
pije
cijt BPth1 > BPi > BPthc
∞ otherwise
(3)
The formulated pricing function is given by equation (3)
and is graphically represented in Figure 3. The purpose of
initially increasing the price linearly is that the out-of-range
users can receive assistance from the in-range users with best
channel conditions providing maximum data rate. However,
as the battery power of the best in-range users is dissipated
beyond BPth1 , they need to push the out-of-range users
towards other in-range users to conserve their battery power.
Thus beyond BPth1 till BPthc , the price is incremented
exponentially with respect to cost. Another advantage of this
formulation of the pricing function is to ensure that each in-
range user gets fair opportunity to relay data for the out-of-
range users, thus resulting in fair utilization of battery power
of in-range users providing longer service time to the out-
of-range users.
The price received by the in-range user for relaying data
provides instantaneous benefit to the in-range users. The CRS
game converts this price into credits for the in-range user
which it can use when it moves out of the transmission
coverage of the AP, thus giving long-term benefit to the in-
range users. The long-term benefit for the in-range user is
given by equation (4).
Bk = Rk − Ck (4)
where k is the in-range user changing its role, Rk is the data
rate node k received as out-of-range user, Ck the cost it bore
as relay and Bk is its long-term benefit. It is advantageous
Fig. 4. Credit-based relay selection (CRS) algorithm
for a node to provide relaying service only if its long term
benefit is greater than zero.
IV. CREDIT-BASED RELAY SELECTION (CRS)
ALGORITHM
The CRS algorithm is based on the CRS game and Figure
4 presents the CRS algorithm with exchange of messages
between the in-range and the out-of-range users. In the
CRS algorithm, the out-of-range users first broadcast the
assistance request message. The in-range user upon receiving
the assistance request message checks two conditions; 1)
whether it is in transmission range of the AP and the out-
of-range user or not i.e. dij ≤ Ti&& dAi ≤ TA and 2)
its battery power is above the critical threshold BPi >
BPthc . The in-range user then calculates its relaying cost
cij =
SBPi
SBPij
and its price using equation (3) to determine its
utility Ui. If its utility is greater than zero, then it sends an
acknowledgement message (ACK) to the out-of-range user
j.
When the out-of-range user j receives ACK from the in-
range users, it determines whether it has enough budget
to pay the price advertised by each in-range user i. If the
criterion on budget is fulfilled, the user j computes its utility
and the in-range user i providing the maximum utility is
selected as relay. User i updates its budget by deducting the
price it will be paying to the chosen relay and also informs
the selected relay. The relay after providing data forwarding
service updates its battery power and adds the received price
to its credits.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In order to evaluate the performance gains provided by
the CRS algorithm, in terms of data rate, fair consumption
of battery power and the long-term benefit for the in-
range users, the CRS algorithm has been compared with
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Fig. 6. Jain’s fair index for battery power consumption when the default
and the CRS algorithms are used for relay selection
a default algorithm. The default algorithm uses only the
Signal to Interference and Noise Ratio (SINR) as the relay
selection criterion, thus the in-range users with best channel
conditions are repeatedly chosen as relays for the out-of-
range users. A network model consisting of five in-range and
ten out-of-range users is simulated with an assistance request
probability of 50% from the out-of-range users. The price
advertised by the in-range user is incremented linearly until
20% of its battery power is consumed and then exponentially
until its battery power reaches 50%, after which it declines
the out-of-range user’s request.
The average data rate achieved by the out-of-range users
when the default and the CRS algorithm are used for relay
selection is depicted in Figure 5. It can be seen that the
CRS algorithm outperforms the default algorithm. In the first
35 simulation slots, the CRS algorithm provides approxi-
mately 30% better data rate. However, the difference between
the data rate attained with the two algorithms drastically
increases with the simulation duration. This is due to the
fact that in the default algorithm there is no mechanism to
ensure fair utilization of battery power, therefore the battery
power of the in-range users with best channel conditions
quickly reach their critical threshold value and can no longer
serve the out-of-range users. The CRS algorithm, on the
other hand, uses both achievable data rate as well as the
fair utilization of battery power, thus provides longer service
time of the in-range users and accomplishes better data rate.
Jain’s fairness index [16] has been used to determine how
fairly the battery power of the in-range users is consumed by
the CRS algorithm compared to the default algorithm. Figure
6 presents the Jain’s fairness index values for the default
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Fig. 7. Simulated network scenario with in-range and out-of-range users
exchanging their role once: (a) Position 1 before exchange; and (b) Position
2 after exchange.
and the CRS algorithms. The higher the Jain’s fairness index
value, the fairer the system. The CRS algorithm uses the ratio
of average to instantaneous battery power consumption for
the calculation of cost incurred and price advertised by the in-
range users, thus providing the in-range users fair opportunity
to act as relays resulting in 85%-90% fair utilization of
battery power of all relays. Whereas for the default algorithm
the value of Jain’s fairness index is just 40%.
To demonstrate the long-term benefit of the CRS algorithm
given by equation(4) and accumulation and usage of credits
earned by a node/user, a network model with nodes exchang-
ing their roles as in-range and out-of range users has been
analyzed. The network model still comprises of 15 nodes
as presented in Figure 7(a); 5 in-range users and 10 out-of-
range users and half way through the simulation duration five
of the out-of-range users swap their roles with the in-range
users. To assess the performance of the CRS algorithm when
such exchange of roles occurs, two test case scenarios have
been considered. In scenario 1, the in-range and out-of-range
users change their positions only once as shown in Figure
7. Whereas for scenario 2, four such exchanges of positions
have been examined. For both test case scenarios, the CRS
algorithm has been compared with the default algorithm.
For the test case scenario 1, the CRS algorithm has
been compared with two different variations of the default
algorithm; default algorithm with obedient users and default
with selfish users. The purpose of comparison is to establish
the long-term benefit provided by the CRS algorithm owing
to its credit-based mechanism and fair consumption of bat-
tery power. Configuration of these two variations of default
algorithm are given below:
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Fig. 8. Simulated network scenario comprising of the remaining two
positions of in-range and out-of-range users for test case scenario 2: (a)
Position 3 and (b) Position 4.
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• In variation 1, for the default algorithm it has been
assumed that the in-range users are obedient users and
do not ask for any price for their services.
• Variation 2 deals with the selfish in-range users who ask
for a price for their services but there is no mechanism
to ensure fair utilization of battery power of the in-range
users.
The results obtained when the in-range and out-of-range
users exchange their roles for these two variations of the
default algorithm in comparison with the CRS algorithm are
discussed below.
1) Variation 1: Figure 9 presents that overall benefit
gained by the nodes who were the in-range users in position
1 depicted in Figure 7(a) and became the out-of-range users
in position 2 shown in Figure 7(b). The overall benefit of a
node depends on the cost it experienced being a relay and the
data rate it received being the out-of-range user. Simulation
duration of 120 slots with a request probability of 50%
from the out-of-range users and the exchange of positions
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Fig. 11. Accumulation of credits when acting as the relay and usage of
credits when become the out-of-range user for the CRS algorithm
occurring after first 60 slots has been simulated. Since the
in-range users for the default algorithm are considered to be
obedient, irrespective of whether the nodes N1, N2, N3, N4
and N5 provide data forwarding service in position 1 or not,
they will always receive assistance when they become the
out-of-range users. This is because the nodes N6, N7, N8,
N9 and N10 in position 2 are also obedient users. Therefore,
all the five nodes N1, N2, N3, N4 and N5 achieve good
positive overall benefit for the default algorithm as well.
There are five relays in position 1 (Figure 7(a)), however
despite the relays being obedient users, the out-of-range
users only avail the services of N5 in case of the default
algorithm. Therefore, in Figure 10 the service time of only
N5 has been plotted. Service time is the duration in which
the relay is assisting the out-of-range users before its battery
power reaches the critical threshold value. From Figure
10, it can be concluded that the CRS algorithm provides
approximately 50% longer service time compared to the
default algorithm with obedient relays in this scenario. This
is due to the pricing function given in equation (3) which
takes into account the fair consumption of battery power.
The formulated pricing function conserves the battery power
of in-range users with best channel conditions and provides
incentives to both in-range users to help the out-of-range
users and to out-of-range users to buy services from the in-
range users which do not provide best SINR but are asking
for less price.
Acquisition of credits by nodes N1, N2, N3, N4 and N5
when they are the in-range users and then the expenditure of
these earned credits when these five nodes become the out-
of-range users is exhibited in Figure 11. The black vertical
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line represents the transition when these five nodes change
their role from providing assistance to requiring assistance.
The flat period in Figure 11 in position 1 represents that
either the node has ran out of its battery power or is asking
for too high a price that the out-of-range user cannot afford.
In position 2 the flattening means that node has exhausted
its credits bank or in other words its budget has been fully
used and has no more budget to buy relaying service for
itself. Figures 12 and 13 present the comparison of the price
received by a node as relay for its services vs the cost it
experienced and the cost incurred by it as relay vs the data
rate it received as the out-of-range user in case of the CRS
algorithm, respectively. From Figures 12 and 13, it is clear
that even though the in-range users experience a cost when
helping the out-of-range users it is still advantageous for
them to participate in the relaying process considering the
benefits provided by the CRS algorithm in terms of credits,
utility and data rate.
2) Variation 2: In variation 2, the default algorithm also
offers price to the in-range users assisting the out-of-range
users irrespective of the cost in terms of battery power
consumption they undergo. Figure 14 shows the overall
benefit gained by the nodes N1, N2, N3, N4 and N5 when
the default algorithm and the CRS algorithm are used for
relay selection. In case of the CRS algorithm, the benefit is
more evenly distributed among the five nodes as compared
to the default algorithm. Also node N4 receives almost
negligible benefit. This is because in position 1 of Figure 7, in
case of the default algorithm N4 has no incentive to help the
out-of-range users, thus earns zero credits and cannot avail
relaying services when it becomes the out-of-range user in
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Fig. 14. Overall benefit attained by nodes when default algorithm
considering selfish in-range users asking for price, irrespective of their cost
and CRS algorithm are used
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Fig. 15. Overall benefit attained by nodes for test case scenario 2 where
the in-range and out-of-range users swap their positions multiple times.
position 2 of Figure 7. Also the cost of providing assistance
as well as fair dissipation of battery power of relays have not
been taken into account while determining the willingness of
the in-range users to act as relays in the case of the default
algorithm.
For the test case scenario 2, the in-range and the out-of-
range users exchange their roles four times as depicted in
Figures 7 and 8. In positions 1 and 3 ( in positions 1 and 4)
of Figures 7 and 8 nodes N1 and N2 (N3, N4 and N5) are
the in-range users whereas in positions 2 and 4 (positions 2
and 3) they become the out-of-range users. In the test case
scenario 2 of swapping of roles, the default algorithm with
pricing irrespective of the relaying cost for the selfish in-
range users is considered.
Figure 15 displays the overall benefit gained by nodes N1,
N2, N3, N4 and N5 swapping their role as the in-range
and out-of-range users multiple times during the simulation
period of 120 slots, twice acting as the relays and twice as
the out-of-range users. Even when the nodes change their
roles multiple times, all nodes receive benefit when the CRS
algorithm is used. Whereas the default algorithm provides
benefit to only N1, N2 and N5 and almost negligible to
N3 and N4, thus giving no long term benefit to N3 and
N4 to assist the out-of-range users. Therefore, the cumulative
utility achieved by N1, N2, N3, N4 and N5 when helping
the out-of-range users is approximately 80% less than that
achieved with the CRS algorithm as depicted in Figure 16
VI. CONCLUSION
An incentive based relay selection algorithm, Credit-based
Relay Selection (CRS) algorithm has been proposed in this
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Fig. 16. Cumulative utility of nodes N1, N2, N3, N4 and N5 for test
case scenario 2 when acting as relays
paper which along with ensuring instantaneous benefit to
relays also presents long-term benefit to them. The long-term
benefit provided by the CRS algorithm has been evaluated
by considering two test case scenarios in which the in-
range and out-of-range users exchanges their roles. From the
obtained simulation results, it can be clearly seen that the
CRS algorithm provides better data rate and fairer utilization
of battery power of in-range users achieving longer service
time compared to the default algorithm. The CRS algorithm
gives enough incentives to encourage the self-interested in-
range users to take part in the relaying process and provides
long-term benefit to all participating users. Despite the cost
experienced when relaying data for the out-of-range users,
it is beneficial for a node to act as a relay considering its
overall benefit in terms of earned credits, utility and data
rate when the CRS algorithm is used for relay selection.
Future work will comprise of performance evaluation of the
CRS algorithm under different mobility models and network
scenario with high mobility users.
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